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Abstract: I assume that identity theories and reductive strategies generally about 
the relationship between both the physical and the mental and the non-social 
and the social fail and I remind the reader why this is so. The mind cannot be 
reduced to body and the social (and this includes social action) cannot be reduced 
to what goes on in the minds of individuals and to their non-social actions, even 
when physical environment is added to the allegedly reducing base. I canvass 
two alternatives: supervenience and constructivism. My discussion of superveni-
ence is by way of a survey of the work of others. Supervenience turns out to be too 
‘brute’ a relation to account for the mind-body or the nonsocial-social relation-
ships (I explain the idea of ‘brute’ in the paper). Supervenience is essentially a co-
variance relation and even if the social were to supervene on the nonsocial, or the 
mental on the physical, supervenience leaves that co-variance inexplicable and 
mysterious. I ask whether constructivist solutions could explain the co-variance 
between levels any better (I look specifically at the work of John Searle) and I 
raise some issues with regard to the ability of constructivism to explain these 
relationships. Searle sees the institutional and social world through the perspec-
tive of various levels, in ways similar to the way in which the reductionist and the 
supervenience theorists did. My main argument is to offer an analogue problem 
for constructivism that was raised for supervenience. I conclude that construc-
tivism could escape the problem of ‘brute’ co-variation between levels only by 
adopting a thoroughgoing irrealist perspective on the institutional and social.
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fail. I assume that this is the case in this paper and I therefore only remind the 
reader why this is so. The mind cannot be reduced to body and the social (and 
this includes social action) cannot be reduced to what goes on in the minds of 
individuals and to their non-social actions, even when the physical environment 
is added to the allegedly reducing base.
I canvass two alternatives: supervenience and constructivism. My discussion 
of supervenience is in the main by way of a survey of the work of others. Super-
venience turns out to be too ‘brute’ a relation to account for the mind-body or the 
nonsocial-social relationships. It is essentially a co-variance relation and even if 
the social supervenes on the nonsocial, or the mental on the physical, superveni-
ence leaves that co-variance inexplicable and mysterious.
I ask whether constructivist solutions could explain the co-variance between 
these levels any better (I look specifically at the work of John Searle) and I raise 
some issues with regard to the ability of constructivism to explain these relation-
ships. Searle sees the institutional and social world through the perspective of 
various levels, from brute physical reality to the institutional, in ways similar to 
the way in which the reductionist and the supervenience theorists did.1 My main 
argument is to offer an analogue problem for constructivism that has been raised 
for supervenience. I conclude that constructivism could escape the problem of 
‘brute’ co-variation between levels only by adopting a thoroughgoing irrealist 
perspective on the institutional and social.
 Medem’s three parts of a person: the physical, 
the mental and the social
There is an old Russian proverb, quoted in Vladimir Medem’s autobiography, 
that says: ‘an individual in Russia was composed of three parts: a body, a soul, 
and a passport’ (Medem 1979).2 It isn’t only that there are these three aspects of a 
person, but moreover that somehow the three are connected. How so?
Just as most philosophers (excluding eliminativists and those who posit pre-
established harmony, for example) believe that there are both the physical and 
mental realms and that they must be connected in some way – the options range 
1 A locus classicus for this picture of levels is Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam (1958).
2 An earlier paper, ‘The Limits of Realism in the Philosophy of Social Science’, that covers some 
of the material in this paper, appeared in Galavotti, M. C., D. Dieks, W. Gonzalez, S. Hartman, 
T. Uebel, and M. Weber (eds.), 2014. In this paper, the section covering supervenience has been 
much reduced, some material (e.g., the discussion of theories of political obligation) has been 
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from reductive identity through supervenience to causation – so too it is plausible 
to believe that the social and the mental (and from now on, we can add ‘the physi-
cal’ along with the mental, without always further specifying it explicitly) have 
some sort of important relationship, whatever that might be. I speak about the 
mental; the philosophy of social science literature often speaks of the individual 
(as in ‘methodological individualism’). For our purposes, these come to the same, 
since the mental facts in which we are interested are mental facts about individual 
persons. The relevant physical facts of course might not be about persons at all.
Where shall we place human action in Medem’s tripartite division? There is 
some unclarity about this in the literature of (so-called) methodological individu-
alism but it is important to get this right. Human action itself divides into social 
and non-social action. It would be an unnecessary digression to make this dis-
tinction explicit, but intuitively, voting, cashing cheques, and engaging in a ritual 
are intrinsically social actions; climbing a mountain, riding a horse, and building 
a shelter are not, even when as a matter of fact they are done in a social setting 
or by a multiplicity of individuals.3 There are many cases whose classification 
will be undecidable without a precise and explicit account of this distinction, but 
other cases, like the ones mentioned above, will be clear. Social actions, or facts 
about them, are part of the social; non-social actions, or facts about them, are to 
be included within the mental-cum-physical.
Here is a compelling if somewhat minimalist thought: if there were no beings 
with a mental life, in particular one that included intentionality, there could be 
no social world. But surely there is much more we can say about the tripartite 
relationship Medem mentions, of the mental and physical on the one hand and 
the social or institutional on the other.
Reduction
What I do in this paper is to discuss the options for understanding this relation-
ship, in part drawing on relevant literature in the philosophy of mind. Reduction, 
eliminated entirely, and perhaps most importantly the section on Searle has been considerably 
expanded and developed. New material, especially on Searle’s work, has been introduced and 
the discussion deepened. I believe that my main criticism has been considerably sharpened and 
developed. This discussion also now takes account of Searle’s 2010. Although the section on su-
pervenience has been reduced, I believe that I am now better able to see the central problem that 
reduction, supervenience, and constructivism share and I try to make that clearer in this paper.
3 For my view on the social versus non-social distinction, whether applied to actions or other 
particulars, see Ruben (1985), Chapter 3. 
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or reductive identity, as one of those options, has been in retreat for the last few 
decades, both in the philosophy of mind and in the philosophy of social science.4 
As Ned Block says, ‘For nearly 30 years, there has been a consensus….that reduc-
tionism is a mistake…’ (and that was said already seventeen years ago.) (Block 
1997, p. 107). If reductionism is a mistake, it is not only identity (between the 
mental and the physical or between the social and the mental) that is in trouble; 
nomological equivalence would be in trouble as well, since many of the argu-
ments against reduction also work against nomological equivalence.5 There have 
been exceptions (Bickle 1998) so not everyone has given up on reduction, but 
the increased attention to supervenience and to mereology and composition has 
been powered by the perception that reduction has failed and that there is a need 
for a non-reductive relation to link the mental with the physical, and the social 
with the non-social.
What I do in this paper is to discuss the prospects for supervenience and con-
structivism (by focusing on the work of John Searle) as alternatives to reduction, 
4 The reductive identity being dismissed by Block and others is ontological, not just discourse 
or theory reduction. Of course, not all cases of failure of reduction of one discourse to another 
entail failure of reduction in an ontological sense. For example, the inability to ‘translate’ physi-
cal object discourse into sense data discourse (‘without remainder’) does not on its own show 
that physical objects are not just sets of sense data. There might just be two languages or dis-
courses, such that no sentence in one can be given a complete translation by any sentence or set 
of sentences in the other, and yet the discourses might be about the same things. The distinction 
between conceptual and ontological reduction is itself unclear, especially when properties are 
added to the list of things to be reduced. But if reductive identity fails in the mental-physical or 
the social-mental cases because of failure of identity or nomic equivalence between properties or 
entities in the allegedly reducing and the to-be-reduced discourses, this will certainly have onto-
logical implication. It would show that we have two distinct or non-identical sets of properties or 
particulars, however they might otherwise be related. 
5 Just to summarise a very long story, type reduction fails because of multiple realisability (and 
the unacceptability of infinite disjunctions or of heterogeneous disjunctions for reductive pur-
poses). Token reduction (at least of events and states) fails because of its dependence on type 
reduction (there are other reasons for failure of token reduction but again the story is too long 
to repeat here).
 There is an added problem with regard to the purported reduction of the social and institu-
tional: a circularity argument. Any specification of the allegedly reducing base will certainly make 
use of social concepts. For example, it is often alleged that a piece of paper’s being money de-
pends on people believing that the paper is money, or at any rate believe that it can be exchanged 
for goods, and so on. But the contents of these beliefs include social concepts. So conceptual 
reduction of the social to the non-social fails. But what of the ontological issue rather than the 
conceptual one? In my view, the allegedly reducing base will also contain references to individual 
social entities of some sort, and will also require the existence of social properties, and not just 
make use of social concepts, so allegedly ontological reduction, and not only conceptual reduc-
tion, will fail the circularity test. See Ruben (1985), Chapters 1 and 3, for the fuller story.
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in understanding the non-social/social relation (or to be more precise, the non-
institutional/institutional relation). Extended discussion of supervenience in the 
philosophy of the mind needs no apology, but even more so because a central 
strategy of this paper is to export the lessons of the failure of supervenience to 
that of construction. I conclude that neither offers us an attractive alternative and 
that we must therefore reconsider other alternatives in understanding the rela-
tions between the social and the non-social.
Supervenience
Supervenience, it was once hoped, would offer an alternative to reduction that at 
one and the same time would be both non-reductive but also non-dualistic.6 On 
this approach, just as the mind and body could be tied by supervenience suffi-
ciently tightly to avoid dualism but not so tightly to collapse them into one, so too 
for the social (or institutional) and the mental: the hope was that the social could 
preserve its integrity but without claiming true autonomy or independence. In the 
philosophy of social science, use of supervenience by which to understand the 
social/non-social relation stretched at least from Currie (1984) to List and Pettit 
(2011) – and no doubt continues. Supervenience would provide the best philo-
sophical example ever of both having and eating the proverbial cake.7
Suppose you find the idea of the supervenience of the social on the mental-
cum-physical a plausible view. Supervenience is an objective (in one sense of that 
6 Identity is a form of supervenience, the strongest form, since every fact supervenes on itself. 
In what follows, when I speak of supervenience, I mean to exclude the case of identity. This is 
a mere terminological convenience that facilitates what I want to say in the simplest fashion. 
7 One of the earliest examples of this hope in the philosophy of social science was Greg Currie’s ‘In-
dividualism and Global Supervenience’ (Currie 1984). For reasons that are especially appropriate in 
the social world, any type of supervenience that is likely to hit the mark will be global rather than in-
dividual or even regional, because the way in which things are socially might depend on the way in 
which things are with individuals far removed in space and time from the particulars that constitute 
the social fact under consideration or from the spatio-temporal region they inhabit. La Guardia may 
have been the mayor of New York, but in order for that to be true, an indeterminate and widespread 
number of other people had to hold certain desires and beliefs. For some practice a person engages 
in, in order for it to count as a tradition, there must be persons engaging in a similar practice many 
times in the past. Social facts require many facts about individuals’ actions or states of mind spread 
in time and space and whose spatio-temporal extent is hard to circumscribe in advance.
 As Currie says, ‘…it is the totality of individual facts which determines the totality of social 
facts’ (Currie 1984, p. 345). The supervenience of the social on mental facts about individuals, for 
him, comes to this: consider two possible worlds, u and w, which have identical individual (mental 
and physical) histories up to and including time t. If so, then the same social facts are true in both u 
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very slippery term) relation that does not depend on thinking, wanting or willing 
it to be so, or on anything human agents do. It is true that in the case of the alleged 
supervenience of the social on the mental, the supervenience base includes indi-
viduals’ beliefs, desires, wishes, non-social actions, and any other mental or 
non-social item one might regard as important for inclusion, but once the super-
venience base is specified, the relation between the supervenience base and what 
supervenes on it is objective, in the sense that that relation holds, if it does, regard-
less of anything further that agents might think or do. In particular, note that social 
constructivism gets no toehold on this picture. Agents collectively don’t construct 
the social world, if ‘construct’ is to retain any of its sense that relates it to action or 
activity, to ‘doing something’. Once the supervenience base is specified, there is 
nothing further for agents to do, make, think, or construct in order for the social to 
supervene. On the supervenience account, whatever they do, make, construct, or 
think has to be either part of the mental-cum-physical or part of the social. All their 
non-social doing and making or constructing is included in the supervenience base 
that allegedly does the accounting or explaining; all their social doing, making, 
or constructing is part of what is said to supervene and is therefore part of what is 
allegedly to be explained and so can’t be any part of the accounting or explaining. 
No conceptual space remains for any further activity needed to ‘join’ the two levels.
The limitations of supervenience
Understood in this way, supervenience certainly has its limitations. It has become 
clear since supervenience was first introduced into the contemporary philosophi-
and w at t. Any two worlds that are indiscernible in terms of individual (physical and mental) facts 
up to and including t are indiscernible with respect to social facts at t; no social difference without 
an individual or physical difference. Note that the converse is not the case: the individual facts won’t 
also supervene on the social. There can certainly be socially indistinguishable worlds that differ in 
terms of individual mental and physical facts. Indeed, multiple realisability insures that this is so.
 The use of supervenience by philosophers of social science has a long history. Currie’s arti-
cle was written in 1984. Christian List and Philip Pettit’s Group Agency (2011) uses the same idea. 
Philosophers of social science many times in between have invoked it.
 List and Pettit explicitly assert that supervenience of the social on the mental allows them 
to steer a middle path between the two traditions of reduction and eliminativism on the one hand 
and emergentism on the other, both of which they reject. It is true that the autonomy they claim 
for the social is epistemological rather than ontological, but it is hard to see why this should be 
so, given their other views. Supervenience is an alleged ontological relation and their own dis-
cussion is conducted in ontological terms: one set of facts determines or fixes another set (e.g., 
p. 65). If supervenience works in the way they want, it ought to yield some sort of ontological and 
not just epistemological autonomy.
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cal literature that it is a very weak relationship, however much it might be modally 
strengthened. The core idea is that if two worlds are identical at the subvenient 
level, then they cannot differ at the supervening level (and contrapositively, if 
they differ at the supervening level, then they must differ in some way at the 
subvenient level). But consider two worlds that differ at the mental level only 
because one agent believes that Paris is the capital of France in one world but that 
agent (or his counterpart) believes that Paris is the capital of Italy in the other. As 
far as supervenience is concerned, there is no limitation on how widely the two 
worlds can differ socially. The two worlds differ at the mental-cum-physical level, 
so supervenience places no constraint at all on how much they might differ at the 
social level.
But even worse is to come. Supervenience is basically a covariance rela-
tion; it simply asserts that the social or institutional varies with the mental (plus 
 physical).8 (Or that the mental varies with the physical.) Supervenience fixes 
one set of facts as the independent element and claims that a second set is the 
dependent variable and varies with that first set. Some refer to supervenience as 
a dependency relation, and that is so: the mental (or physical) is the independent 
variable; the social relative to the mental (or the mental relative to the physical) 
is the dependent variable.
But the idea of dependency when used in this context should not be taken to 
imply more than that. Given the sun’s height, if one makes the length of the flag 
pole’s shadow the independent variable, the height of the flagpole will be the 
dependent variable, in the sense that the latter’s value will depend on the values 
of the former two. But there is no causal relation running from the length of the 
shadow to the height of the pole nor does the former explain the latter in any 
sense or make the latter what it is (Ruben 2011, p. 175–176).
If social facts were identical to individual mental facts or sets thereof, then 
the social facts would co-vary with the individual mental facts and the identity of 
the two sets of facts would then explain why they co-vary, i.e., because they are 
the same fact(s). In the case of identity, there is nothing more to explain other 
than why we have two ways of talking about the same things. We would need to 
tell a story about why we have two discourses rather than one, what purpose one 
fulfills that the other does not. But if we reject reduction in the social case, here 
too the need arises for an explanation of the co-variation between the superveni-
ent institutional and the subvenient facts. Supervenience does not provide that 
explanation; on the contrary, it merely invites it.
Some relations are not just dependency relations in that weak sense but what 
we might call determinative relations: one fact or set of facts explains another 
8 Horgan (1993).
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because the first makes the second occur, happen, or whatever. Parts make a 
whole what it is. Matter or material constitutes substances. Causes bring about 
their effects. Such relations are the stuff from which explanation is built.
Determinative here does not mean deterministic. Even if causation is proba-
bilistic, when c probabilistically causes e, c determines e in the sense I have in 
mind, brings e about or makes e what it is. Kim’s early paper in this area ran 
together the ideas of dependency and determination (Kim 1974). In that paper, 
Kim wisely never included supervenience as a determinative relation. In terms of 
the distinction between dependency and determinative relations, I would classify 
supervenience as a dependency relation but not as a determinative relation.9 The 
subvenient base facts do not make the supervenient facts what they are in the 
way in which causes make their effects what they are or parts make the whole of 
which they are the parts what it is.
When the two sets of facts, the subvenient mental and the supervenient 
social, are not identical, then because supervenience is not a determinative rela-
tion, there is nothing in the mere fact of supervenience that obviously explains 
why two sets of distinct facts co-vary, why the one is the independent variable 
and the other the dependent variable. Many writers have noted that what super-
venience so understood omits is any explanatory account of why two sets of facts 
co-vary. On Currie’s and List and Pettit’s view, it may be true that the social varies 
with the mental, and not vice versa, but if this is all that can be said, it remains a 
mystery why this should be so.
Many philosophers have pointed out how supervenience between any two 
distinct sets of facts by itself leaves an undischarged obligation to resolve a 
mystery. There is nothing very novel in my remarks above. Two such philosophers 
are Kim (1997) and Horgan (1993) but there are many others (see for example Ned 
Block 1997). Kim pointed this out in ‘The Mind-Body Problem: Taking Stock After 
Forty Years’: ‘…the mere fact…of mind-body supervenience leaves open the ques-
tion of what grounds or accounts for it – that is, why the supervenience relation 
obtains…’ (Kim 1997, p. 189–190). Horgan’s goal is to strengthen the supervenience 
relationship so that there is not only covariance between supervenient and sub-
venient facts, but the fact that there is this supervenience (what he calls a ‘super-
venience fact’) should be explicable in terms compatible with the subvenient 
base level (Horgan 1993). This is what he amusingly calls ‘superdupervenience’.
There are three things to consider on Horgan’s view: (1) the subvenient base 
facts (in our case, the non-social mental facts plus the physical facts); (2) the 
supervenient facts (the social or institutional facts); and (3) the fact that (2) 
9 I once argued the opposite view, in Explaining Explanation, 2012 (second edition). I hereby 
recant. 
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supervenes on (1). Horgan’s claim, for example, for physicalism, is that some 
account of (3), the supervenience fact, must be forthcoming by the supervenience 
theorist that is acceptable to a physicalist. Pari passu, a Horgan-like position on 
the issue for the philosophy of social science is that some account of why the fact 
that the social and institutional supervenes on the non-social (the mental-cum-
physical) must be forthcoming and that that account must not itself reintroduce 
the social or institutional into the explanation’s explanans.
As far as I can see, Horgan offers no reason why there must be such an expla-
nation, why it cannot be left as a brute fact that one level supervenes on another, 
but I agree that this would not be acceptable. Compare the case with that of covar-
iance and causation. If one places no restrictions on what counts as a property, 
and allows a property to be as detailed as is necessary to make it applicable as a 
matter of contingent fact to only one instance, the world will be full of accidental 
generalisations: whenever an event of type F occurs, it is followed by an event of 
type G.10 However, where we have (what we might call) salient or non-contrived 
correlations of Fs and Gs – e.g., lighting and thunder, day and night, smoke and 
fire, for example – we assume there is some causal connection that explains why 
the correlation is as it is. I think that the same impulse applies to supervenience 
as to correlation. Surely supervenience isn’t like a truly accidental generalisation. 
If Gs supervene on Fs, we want an account of why this should be so, why it is no 
accident that Gs supervene on or co-vary with Fs.11
Irrealism
Horgan himself is dubious that there can be a materialistically acceptable account 
of why mental facts supervene on physical facts and he is tempted, as a result, 
by irrealism about the mental as a way out of the dilemma. What he means by 
that is this. The difficulty in meeting the requirement for an explanation of the 
supervenient by the subvenient arises when one presupposes that these are two 
distinct sets of facts. But if the supervenient lacks ontological reality, the explana-
tion is more straightforward. Horgan’s example here is R. M. Hare’s account of the 
supervenience of the moral on the non-moral (Hare 1964). In its bare bones, Hare 
is a non-cognitivist. Hare does not assume that there is a set of moral facts dis-
tinct from the non-moral facts such that the former supervenes on the latter. Hare 
10 See Ruben (1982).
11 I accept that there must be brute correlations between immediate causes and effects; not 
every causal linkage can be only mediate. The same might be true about supervenience. But we 
accept such brute correlations only reluctantly, having exhausted all other options.
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talks of the purposes to which moral discourse is put, and it is moral discourse 
(‘the language of morals’) that supervenes on non-moral discourse.
Horgan calls Hare’s account ‘irrealist’, and one can see why, although this is 
not a term that Hare used himself. Moral language does not describe anything, 
neither moral facts nor the descriptive facts on which such discourse supervenes. 
The discourse of morality does not ‘connect’ to reality in that way. It has a differ-
ent purpose or function, to commend certain actions or to prescribe them, not to 
describe them.
So Hare’s view of morality is an irrealist (or non-cognitivist) view and the 
supervenience thesis is one about two discourses, one factual and the other 
used for teaching standards, not two areas or realms of reality. There is no 
property of goodness; there are properties, say P, Q, and R, in virtue of which 
we can call a particular object ‘good’ or a particular action ‘right’, and to call 
the object ‘good’ or the action ‘right’ is not to assert that the thing has another 
property, goodness, in addition to P, Q, and R or even that it has the property 
goodness such that goodness = {P or Q or R}. The function of moral discourse 
is not to introduce properties at all, but to commend things that have P or Q 
or R. As such, sentences of the moral discourse lack truth-values since they do 
not state that anything is thus-and-so. The irrealist view comes into its own 
in the explanation of the purposes of the second discourse, the supervening 
discourse.
Social constructivism
Does social constructivism offer a better alternative to supervenience as a way of 
understanding the relation between the social and the non-social (or, in Searle’s 
case, the institutional and the non-institutional)?12 The thesis I want to advance 
is that it does not. I want to use John Searle’s work on the social world as my 
example. I should say that I am not interested in the detail of Searle’s construc-
tivism; I am principally interested in it as an example of a type of approach in 
solving the question of the social/non-social relation. I shall of course try to com-
petently reproduce what he has to say on the topics that interest me, and if I were 
to fail to do that, I would of course be open to legitimate criticism. But I am not 
interested in the detail and nuance of his views.
Exactly what ontological status does Searle attribute to institutional realty? I 
believe that there is some ambiguity in his views about this. Searle, for example, 
12 The Construction of Social Reality (Searle 1995); Making the Social World (Searle 2010).
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dismisses both reduction and supervenience as misleading.13 Some have inter-
preted him to be espousing a form of the ontological reduction of the social in 
spite of his eschewing that term, but such an interpretation is not in the spirit 
of what he says about reduction in his treatment of the mind-body problem. If 
that were the right reading of Searle, what follows would be otiose. As I have 
already made clear, I do not think that any form of ontological reduction is viable, 
either in the philosophy of the mind or in the philosophy of social science, but 
this paper has not attempted to show that this is so.
I understand Searle’s theory as an attempt to link the institutional, and the 
social more generally, to brute reality, without producing a reductive view in the 
classical sense of that term. His theory carries a hope similar to that carried by 
the supervenience theories: to articulate a theory that at one and the same time 
in some sense respects the integrity and the objectivity of the institutional but yet 
relates the institutional to the underlying reality on which it is based. This isn’t 
a reductionist project and the narrative that Searle tells about the emergence of 
the institutional is meant, I think, to provide an account that meets the two con-
straints, both the integrity of the institutional and its dependence.
So I read Searle as offering an account of the non-social/social and institu-
tional relation that is intended to be distinctive, neither one of reduction nor one 
of supervenience. I take that to be the point of constructivism. He is at least one 
constructivist theorist who thinks that it does provide a third alternative of some 
sort.
13 See Searle (2010, p. 4–5). When he begins his discussion, Searle speaks as if he is propos-
ing a supervenience account: at the level of types, he says, thinking makes it so. One might be 
forgiven for thinking that what Searle is saying is that something’s being money supervenes on 
everyone’s believing that it is money. ‘Construction’ is this context would just be a metaphor for 
supervenience. Even so interpreted, his account would have some important differences with 
Currie’s. But as I go on to make clear, this is not the right interpretation of what he is proposing.
 Searle discusses reduction and supervenience at length in Searle (1992). As this discussion 
is focused only on the case of consciousness, it is unclear exactly what can be extrapolated to 
the case of society and institutions. In that discussion, Searle distinguishes different senses of 
reduction, rejects ontological reduction but embraces what he calls causal reduction: ‘This is a 
relation between any two types of things that can have causal powers, where the existence and 
a fortiori the causal powers of the reduced entity are shown to be entirely explicable in terms of 
the causal powers of the reducing phenomena’ (p. 114). Searle focuses not on the existence in 
what follows, but on the causal powers. The discussion of supervenience adds nothing to this. 
The nub of the claim is that the higher-level phenomena are caused by the lower-level ones, but 
that this ‘in no way diminishes their [the latter’s] causal efficacy’ (p. 126). It is hard to resist the 
conclusion that this is either a form of epiphenomenalism (which he explicitly rejects) or of full-
blown dualism. It is not easy to see how this concession to the causal efficacy of the higher-level, 
even if that causal efficacy is explained by the lower-level, does not give some unreduced causal 
role to the higher-level. 
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Searle, from his earliest papers, has made attempts at joining those levels, for 
example by showing how evaluative facts can be derived ultimately from brute 
ones (Searle 1964) (see also Ruben 1972.). The point I want to make here is to 
stress the extent to which Searle has accepted the levels picture in his attempts to 
join the levels (CSR, 5–7, 68).
Searle speaks most often in terms of the creation or the construction of the 
social. ‘Construction’ is in the title of his first book; ‘Making’, a causal idea, is in 
the title of his second. Construct and creation certainly sound like determinative 
relations. Searle spends a great amount of time describing the mechanisms by 
which the construction or creation are brought about but I think there is a lack 
of clarity on what this relation itself is and what the ontological upshot is when 
those mechanisms are in play.
Searle’s ontology
Searle’s argument is conducted in the terminology of facts.14 ‘…all institutional facts 
are created…’ (MSW 93); ‘the [institutional] facts….are all created by human subjec-
tive attitudes..’ (MSW, ix); institutional facts ‘are all created by human subjective atti-
tudes’ (CSR, p. ix). His hierarchical taxonomy of facts (Searle 1995, p. 121–125) makes 
this clear. Searle’s taxonomy of facts has seven distinct levels, but for our purposes I 
will consider only four levels. The simplification will help us see the overall picture 
and that picture won’t change in its essentials if we were to bring in the full complex-
ity: (a) brute or physical facts, (b) non-social mental facts and facts about non-social 
action, (c) social facts that (only) require some sort of collective mentality (collective 
agreement and collective intentionality for example) and (d) institutional facts. In the 
work of his that we are considering, Searle is not interested in the relation between (a) 
and (b) (that is the mind-body problem). Nor is he primarily interested in the relation 
between (b) and (c). Searle is clear that the (c) facts cannot be reduced to (b) facts 
(a good reason not to interpret Searle’s account as generally reductionist), because 
collective intentionality cannot be reduced to individual intentionality. Searle’s main 
focus is the explanation of (d) facts by (a), (b), and (c) facts.
It is true that Searle speaks of institutional facts as being language-depend-
ent or intentionality-related facts and that he contrasts them, as a realist about 
14 Note that mental states and action come in three kinds: mental and action facts that are non-
social (being in pain, lifting a stone); mental and action facts that are social but not institu-
tional (we-intending to go for a walk together, a group hunting together); and mental and action 
facts that require an institutional framework (remembering a recent football match, cashing a 
cheque). (I assume that remembering is factive.)
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the physical world, with the mind/language-independent facts of the latter. That 
means, I think, that a necessary condition for there being facts of that kind is that 
there be minds or language (depending on the precise formulation offered). ‘…the 
institutional fact in question can exist only if it is represented as existing’ (CSR, 
62–63). To put it metaphysically, facts at level (d) have necessary connections to 
facts at the other levels, but that is not to say that the (d) facts are not an identifi-
able set of facts of their own sort. Indeed, his hierarchical taxonomy assumes that 
they are.
In MSW (17-8), Searle describes such facts as epistemically objective but onto-
logically subjective. What does he mean by ontological subjectivity? His other 
examples of ontologically subjective items are ‘pains, tickles, and itches’ because 
‘they exist only as experienced by human or animal subjects’. Institutions belong 
to a ‘category of entities that…are dependent for their existence on the mental…’. 
They are intentionality-relative. One way to understand this somewhat vague 
formulation is that institutions are entities with necessary connections to the 
mental. But that is not the same as saying that institutions or facts about them 
can be reductively identified with non-institutional things (like mental states) 
or facts about them. Pains and tickles might exist only as experienced but that 
does not preclude the possibility that they constitute a set of particulars that are 
irreducible.
So Searle speaks of facts, institutional facts, however dependent they are 
on mind. He says that his ‘account must be consistent with the basic facts and 
show how the nonbasic facts are dependent on and derived from the basic facts’ 
(MSW, 4). So precisely what kind of entities exactly are institutions? He carefully 
distinguishes the nature of the institutional world from that of the physical world; 
he is not ‘a realist’ about the institutional in the sense that what is real can exist 
part from the existence of mind. On the other hand, as I have claimed, I don’t 
think he can be categorised as a reductionist, because he speaks of institutional 
facts, not about two languages or discourses about the same set of facts or things.
Construction and composition
The remarks in this section are addressed to those who interpret Searle (wrongly 
in my view) as offering a reductive view. I think a helpful analogy here in thinking 
about Searle’s claims about construction and whether it is reductive is to con-
sider artifacts such as clocks or tables. [Of course, no analogy is perfect; between 
any two particulars whatever, unless they are qualitatively identical in all of their 
properties (including their relational properties) however unnatural or contrived, 
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there is some disanalogy between them.] I appreciate that Searle holds that social 
acts have an ontological primacy relative to social objects (CSR, 56–57). Still, 
I think the analogy between social objects and artifacts will be useful.
Parts compose a sum; types of matter (wood, plastic, glass) constitute or 
make up objects. The relation between composition and constitution is a matter 
of some controversy (Evnine 2011). To simplify, let me stick with composition, 
which I interpret here as a mereological relation governed by the axioms of clas-
sical mereology, including: the axioms of transitivity, unrestricted composition, 
and uniqueness of composition.
One might suspect that the idea of construction in the social case has some-
thing of a metaphor ring about it. Do agents really and literally construct or make 
institutions? Maybe, maybe not. But in the case of artifacts, artisans really do 
literally make and construct them from their parts. One can construct a table from 
some legs, a top, and so on; one can construct a clock from various bits of metal, 
the springs, the wheels, and so on.
There is certainly a mereological sum of those clock-parts and a mereologi-
cal sum of the table-parts. There are (also) a clock and a table. But I do not 
think that one can reductively identify the clock with sum of the bits of metal 
from which it is constructed, or the table with the sum of the table-parts that 
compose it. There are many good reasons for denying that the sum of the parts 
is identical to the artifact or object.15 The table and the clock (and indeed ordi-
nary objects more generally, not just artifacts) seem to have properties that the 
sums of their parts do not have; the table and the clock can survive changes that 
the sums cannot survive. They differ in their modal and historical properties. 
Artifacts and natural objects violate the mereological axiom of the uniqueness 
of composition and so, it would seem, cannot be identified with the sums of 
their components or parts. The sense in which the parts of something ‘compose’ 
a mereological sum is not the same as the non-mereological (and perfectly ordi-
nary) sense in which the various components ‘compose’ an artifact or ordinary 
object.
What’s the ‘take-home’ here for the interpretation of Searle? To use two of 
Searle’s own examples of social objects, restaurants and passports certainly have 
parts. The parts of the passport are the individual pages; the parts of the restau-
rant might be the various rooms into which it is divided (‘which part of the restau-
rant do you want to sit in, the noisy or the quiet one?’). These parts have sums in 
15 There is a vast literature on composition versus identity. The locus classicus is Alan Gibbard 
(1975), ‘Contingent Identity’. Journal of Philosophical Logic 4: 187–221. For a fuller bibliography, 
see Ryan Wasserman’s bibliography in his article on ‘Material Constitution’ in the Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy (online). 
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the mereological sense. But what is the relationship between these sums and the 
restaurant and the passport? If the relationship wasn’t one of identity in the case 
of the artifacts, it is no more likely to be the relation of identity in the social case, 
for similar reasons. The axiom of the uniqueness of composition is not true for 
such social objects; a passport can lose or gain a page and remain numerically the 
same passport. In addition, transitivity does not hold for these social objects: the 
rooms make up the restaurant and the restaurant helps make up the Federation 
of Restaurants, but the rooms don’t help make up the Federation (Ruben 1985, 
p. 45–81).
So there is no sense in which restaurants and passports can be identified 
with or reduced to the mereological sum of the parts that ‘compose’ them. In any 
event, the analogy won’t extend naturally to most of the cases in which Searle is 
interested. Cocktail parties, marriage, institutions generally, do not seem to have 
parts (even in the non-mereological sense) in the way in which restaurants and 
passports have them.16
Note that bringing in the idea of intention or function does not tilt the argu-
ment any further towards identity. If clocks cannot be identified with the sums of 
their parts, a fortiori they cannot be identified with the sums of parts such that 
people intend to tell time with the sum of parts, or such that the sum of parts is 
given the function of time keeping.
Argument against constructivism
In the argument that follows, I am aware that I am posing a set of questions about 
Searle’s story that is not in his text. These are not the questions he would ask or 
even the terms in which he would view his work. I acknowledge that. But I believe 
that if we export some of the earlier lessons about supervenience and reduction 
and import it into a consideration of Searle’s view, we will gain some insight into 
the success or failure of his approach.
The problem that I am going to discuss has analogues both in reduction and 
supervenience. What reduction, supervenience, and constructivism all share is 
the view of reality as consisting of distinct levels, arranged in some type of hierar-
chy. As I mentioned earlier, Searle speaks in terms of a hierarchical taxonomy of 
facts; this is not an imposition on Searle but a way of seeing things that he shares 
with reduction and supervenience theorists.
16 I have discussed the applicability of mereology to the case of the social world in Ruben (1985), 
Chapter 2. See Hindriks (2013) for an account of social entities as constituted or composed by 
non-social entities.
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All three types of theorists have as a consequence to address the issue of how 
these levels are connected, conceptually and ontologically, and in particular the 
issue of what exactly is the status of what allegedly does the connecting.
In the case of the classical reduction (by derivability) of theories, bridge laws 
were meant to provide the connectability. In order to achieve derivability, con-
nectability of the reduced and reducing theories needed to be insured. Let T* 
be the theory to be reduced; let T be the reducing theory. In the most interest-
ing cases, the vocabulary of T and T* will differ and a set of bridge laws, B, was 
required that connected the terms of the reduced theory to that of the reducing 
theory. So in effect T* would be derived from the conjunction of (T&B); the bridge 
laws became an addition to the reducing theory T.
Lynch and Glasgow (2003) address a similar (but to be sure, not quite the 
same) concern regarding Horgan’s superdupervenience requirement. Recall the 
third set of facts, (3), that are meant to explain the supervenience itself. They ask 
on what does this third set of facts, the S-facts, supervene? Putting the question 
somewhat more generally than they do, we could ask about the status of what-
ever explanation of the supervenience is on offer. Is that explanation part of the 
subvenient base or of the supervenient facts or of what? It cannot just free-float 
on its own, apart from occupying some place in the hierarchy.
I think an analogue of these problems affect Searle’s constructivist narra-
tive too. Searle offers a narrative, as it were, of how institutional facts eventually 
arise or derive from brute facts. A structure, the hierarchy of facts, is clearly there 
in that narrative. I want to ask precisely how those levels that he identifies are 
related, and what would explain their relation.
Let’s call the set of all the relevant brute (in Searle’s sense) physical facts set 
B. Let’s call the set of institutional facts set I. Searle interposes at least two levels 
between the brute and the institutional. Let’s call the set of non-social mental and 
non-social action facts set M. The set of social facts, whether social actional, or 
non-actional social but still non-institutional, is set S. As I said before, this tax-
onomy is simpler than Searle’s; it brings together ontologically related levels so 
that I can pose the problem on which I want to focus more sharply.
Consider now the entire story about collective intentionality, status function, 
constitutive rules, acceptance or recognition, which Searle tells about the mecha-
nisms that lead to the construction or creation of institutional facts.
We can break up his story that gets us to I, by distinguishing its components. 
Each part of his story must belong either to B or M or S. Some parts of that story 
will be located in M. Other parts of the story will be located in S. Clearly, if the 
story is about the emergence of institutional facts, the I facts, every part of that 
story must be located either in B or M or S. No part of the story can be located in 
I, on pain of circularity. Iterations of constitutive rules can provide ever higher 
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levels of institutional facts (CSR, 80), but all such rules must ‘bottom out’ at the 
brute level (CSR, 56 and 191).
Where shall we place the constitutive rules and the collective intentional 
assignment of functions to objects? For Searle, these are the same thing. Searle 
says that ‘institutional facts exist only within systems of constitutive rules’ (CSR, 
28), ‘where the imposition of status function…becomes a matter of general policy, 
the formula…becomes a constitutive rule’ (CSR, 48), and ‘the class of existing 
status functions is identical with the class of institutional facts’ (CSR, 124). Searle 
places them on level 6 of his hierarchy of facts.
On the other hand, there is some reason to suppose that Searle thinks that 
they will be the provider of the bridge (CSR, 41) that gets us from one level to 
another, especially from M or S to I. ‘The central span on the bridge from physics 
to society….and the decisive movement on that bridge…is the collective imposi-
tion of function…’ (CSR, 41). (See also CSR, 68.) Indeed, Searle’s identification of 
constitutive rules (and hence, institutions) with collective assignment of function 
may itself be a bridge, since the former are clearly at level I and yet the collec-
tive imposition of function seems to be at level S (or maybe even M). But if these 
are errors on my part, by all means the reader is free to place them elsewhere or 
together as Searle says. The main point is only this: constitutive rules and the col-
lective assignment of function (whether identical or not) must be either members 
of set I or set S or set M, for they must be placed somewhere and these exhaust the 
options of where to place them (it is obvious that neither are at the brute physical 
level).
Like bridge laws or superdupervenient explanations, they cannot free float 
apart from some location in the hierarchy. Since they must be placed at one of the 
levels of the hierarchy, I cannot see how they could provide any ‘bridge’ between 
levels.
The need for superduperconstructivism
Looked at in this way, one might wonder how Searle’s constructivism could pos-
sibly offer any alternative to supervenience. Once the constitutive rules or collec-
tive assignment of function or any other part of his narrative is placed in whatever 
level of the hierarchy is appropriate, the question of the relations between the 
hierarchical levels re-arises. These questions about the relation between sets M 
and S on the one hand and set I on the other sound very much like the questions 
we had about supervenience. Nor can any item serve both as a bridge between 
the hierarchical levels and be placed somewhere within the hierarchical levels.
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Do the facts of set I merely co-vary with the facts in set M and S? What 
explains the co-variation? It seems that no part of the story, if each part belongs 
to one of S, M, B, or I, can explain the co-variation since each part stands in need 
of the explanation of the co-variation that we seek. What Searle wants is a story 
that tells us how we get from levels M and S on the one hand to level I on the 
other. He wants and requires a linking story. But every part of that story must 
itself belong to either M, or S, or I. How could there be a linking story that did not 
itself already belong to one of the levels? But if the story already belongs to one 
of the levels, B or S or M or I, it cannot explain how any one of those levels arises 
from the other(s).
The institutional facts co-vary with what happens at the level of the facts of 
collective intentionality, assignment of function, and so on. The question that 
needs answering is how all the facts in sets S, M, and B make the facts in set I 
what they are. How do the facts about what agents we-intend, believe, consent 
to, agree on, which functions they collectively ascribe, and so on, account for or 
explain the existence of institutions? Even given that the I facts occur when the B, 
S, and M facts do, this is insufficient for explaining how the latter facts make the 
I-facts what they are.
In general, thinking, agreeing, assigning, or whatever social or non-social 
mental acts are involved, does NOT make it so. Once the meanings of terms are 
settled, a cow counts as a ruminant, whatever agents think about this matter. A 
bag of feathers won’t work as a clock, whatever function agents attempt to collec-
tively assign to the bag. Searle is of course completely aware of this (for instance, 
CSR, 123–124). It is a fact that when agents are in these mental states, thinking, 
collectively assigning a function, agreeing, or whatever, such institutional facts 
come into being, but I can see nothing in his account that explains why this co-
variation should be so. One can read Searle’s account as an elaborate theory of 
that co-variation (not his term, of course) but without any explanation of it.
So what we still lack is any account of why believing or consenting or accept-
ing or we-intending or collectively assigning a function, that something counts 
as something else, or has such a function, should bring it about that something 
really does count as or is something else or has that function. Why or how do all 
these mental and social action facts about what people think and do bring those 
institutional facts about?
I think it is clear that Searle’s narrative about institutions is infinitely more 
plausible than an analogue narrative would be about the cow or the bag of feath-
ers, but why should that be so? Why does believing or collective function assign-
ing make it so in the institutional world? ‘But where the type of thing is concerned, 
the belief that the type is a type of money is constitutive of its being money...’ 
(Searle 1995, p. 33). ‘If everyone always thinks that this sort of thing is money,.... 
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then it is money....And what goes for money goes for elections, private property, 
wars, voting, promises, marriages, buying and selling, political offices, and so on’ 
(Searle 1995, p. 32).
As long as we think of two sets of facts, institutional facts and the other facts, 
Searle can only offer us a form of construction that is a dependence relation, not 
a genuine determinative relation, if we think of the explanandum and explanans 
as sets of facts. On the model of two sets of facts, what we would need but are not 
given is superduperconstruction.
It is easy to miss this point because the story moves so effortlessly and plau-
sibly from level to level, and we need to ask whether there is something more in 
the case of the institutional that underpins this account and that is missing in 
the case of the cow and the bag of feathers. The easy plausibility of Searle’s story 
is at odds with the hierarchical picture he has of the various levels of reality. My 
guess is that many of those who are happy to subscribe to his narrative about the 
emergence of institutional facts have not fully appreciated the extent to which it 
is in tension with the hierarchical approach that he has to the problem and the 
consequent need to connect the levels by something outside the hierarchy.
Recall that Hare was a non-cognitivist about ethics. Horgan read this as a 
form of irrealism, because Hare does not take moral discourse to be about any-
thing; it is not a descriptive language at all, but a prescriptive one. An irrealist 
about ethics would eschew the category of moral facts altogether. Moral irrealism 
(or noncognitivism) does not construe moral sentences as expressing proposi-
tions with truth-values. The irrealist or non-cognitivist about ethics would hold 
the view that there are no moral facts; there is only a moral discourse, prescrip-
tive moral discourse. On that model, we don’t have the same need for co-variance 
between two sets of facts. We might, analogously, speak of co-variance between 
two levels of discourse but that is an altogether easier co-variance to explain, and 
Hare does explain it.
There is certainly no sign in Searle that he would wish to adopt such an view: 
that there are no institutional facts, no distinct set of facts I, just a new institu-
tional-discourse in which to speak about the facts of sets B, M and S (or just a new 
social-discourse to speak about the facts of sets B and M). An irrealist position 
about the institutional ought similarly to eschew the idea of truth in social and 
institutional discourse and the idea that there are any facts in these areas. The 
need for an explanation of the co-variance between the facts in set I and the other 
facts would disappear at a stroke, since there would be no such thing as ‘the facts 
in set I’. Searle’s narrative could proceed as before, with the same plausibility, but 
without making any metaphysical commitment to institutional facts of any sort, 
even to mind or language dependent ones.
Brought to you by | Shih Chien University
Authenticated | d.ruben@bbk.ac.uk author's copy
Download Date | 11/24/14 2:14 PM
20      David Hillel Ruben
I want to suggest that, just as Horgan was tempted to irrealism of the mental, 
given the inability to give an account of why the mental supervened on the 
physical, I would say that any attempt, along lines like Searle’s, to explain why 
something’s really counting as something else is created by or constructed from 
peoples’ consent and agreement or beliefs and we-intentions or collective assign-
ment of functions or whatever would lead to a form of social irrealism. How could 
there be a story that explained why the institutional co-varies with the non-insti-
tutional or the non-social if every part of the story belongs to one or the other of 
the levels in his taxonomy? If they all belong to some part of the story, they can’t 
explain simultaneously the linkages between the parts.
As long as we have two sets of descriptive facts, the brute, mental, and social 
on the one side, and the institutional on the other, we need a story of why these 
two sets of facts should co-vary. Searle’s narrative cannot meet that challenge 
because all of the elements of his story belong to one of the levels whose co-vari-
ation requires explanation. But if we were to construe institutional discourse not 
as a fact stating discourse at all, but one whose function was other than fact-
stating, the mystery would be solved, as it might be in the case of the non-moral 
and moral and as Hogan toys with the thought that it might be solved for the case 
of the physical and the mental. Searle’s constructivism, so interpreted in spite of 
his wishes, would then be a form of irrealism about the institutional. I don’t for 
a moment suggest that Searle would accept this. The point is only that we have a 
limited number of well-known options, and that irrealism is one of them.
On the other hand, if we could only relate the institutional facts to the other facts, 
we would not need to be irrealists about the institutional. The argument of this paper 
is that Searle’s version of constructivism does not deliver a credible answer to the 
question of the relation between the allegedly institutional facts and the other facts, 
since all the parts of his narrative belong to one or other of the facts in that relation.
If the lessons of supervenience are taken to heart, then I think they infect 
the constructivist too. The choices we have for accounting for the relationship 
between institutional facts and the other facts are really only eliminativism, 
reductionism, irrealism, and emergence and no constructivist (or supervenience) 
talk should be allowed to soften that stark choice.
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